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Just a decade ago, crafting the case against the American death
penalty might have seemed a quixotic exercise. Nationwide, there were
more executions carried out and more death sentences rendered in the late
1990s than in any other period since the reinstatement of capital
punishment in 1976.1 Thirty-eight states had active death penalty statutes
at the turn of the century, another high-water mark in the modern death
2penalty era. In the political arena, a Texas governor renowned for signing
death warrants without blinking was an early favorite to win the 2000
presidential election. 3 In short, the "machinery of death," to quote the late
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, was churning in full force.
4
Fortunately for those skeptical of the machinery's merit, times have
changed. Though the death penalty remains both popular and functioning
in many states, particularly in the South, the golden age of the late 1990s
has given way to a new wave of reflection, criticism and opposition. For
the first time in a generation, the ultimate question of capital punishment-
whether governments should kill people for killing other people because
killing people is wrong-has entered an unpredictable stage in the United
States.
Despite the entreaty reproduced above, which exposes the pitfalls of
capital sentencing, the Court of Appeals of New York declined to address
the ultimate question in People v. Taylor.5 Instead, the court affirmed and
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See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions by Year,
http://wxvw.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
2 The thirty-eight death penalty states in 1998 were the following: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
3 See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, Poll gives Bush edge over Gore for 2000, USA
TODAY, May 12, 1998.
4 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' 9 N.Y.3d 129 (N.Y. 2007).
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applied People v. LaValle, in which it found a procedural flaw in New
York's 1995 death penalty statute.7  Lawmakers in Albany have yet to
respond to LaValle by passing a new and improved statute, so with the
Taylor decision emptying New York's death row, capital punishment is
now officially off the books in the Empire State. Though major news
outlets often present that development in its provincial context, the reality is
that New York and other states abandoning capital punishment are
intricately connected to the national debate.
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment,8 and for the past fifty years the Supreme Court has
interpreted that prohibition in light of the nation's "evolving standards of
decency." 9 The Eighth Amendment therefore bans not only those sanctions
outlawed at the time of the Constitution's framing, but also all sanctions
that offend contemporary conceptions of appropriate punishment. In
assessing contemporary conceptions, the Court has relied principally on the
objective evidence of state legislation 10 simply put, if the state legislatures
6 3 N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004).
7 Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d at 138.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.). See
also, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (holding that the execution of
the insane constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
312 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded offenders constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (holding that the
execution ofjuvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
10 The heavy reliance on state legislation appears in the context of both opinions
of the Court and plurality opinions. See Gregg. v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.) ("The most marked indication
of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to
Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 438 (1972)]. The legislatures of at least 35 states have
enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result
in the death of another person."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (White, J.) ("in reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's
mandate, none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to
include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital
offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised
statutes Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death
penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, responding to those
decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws, they re-enacted the death penalty
for murder but not rape .... Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the
present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult
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across the nation overwhelmingly reject a practice, then the Court considers
that practice cruel and unusual punishment. And though the Court has
entertained considerations such as international opinion as well, 1 it has
woman..."): Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-791 (1982) (Thirty-six state and
federal jurisdictions presently authorize the death penalty. Of these, only eight
jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for participation in a
robbery in which another robber takes life.); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 ("Today, no State in
the Union permits the execution of the insane."); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152-154
(1987) ("Four states authorize the death penalty in felony-murder cases upon a showing
of a culpable mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life.
Two jurisdictions require that the defendant's participation be substantial and the statutes
of at least six more.. take minor participation in the felony expressly into account in
mitigation of the murder .... [i]t can be said that all these jurisdictions, as well as the six
States which Enmand classified... as permitting capital punishment for felony murder
simpliciter, and the three States which simply require some additional aggravation before
imposing the death penalty upon a felony murderer, specifically authorize the death
penalty in a [case such as this] .... On the other hand.. only 11 States authorizing capital
punishment forbid imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant's
participation in the felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial
as to raise an inference of extreme recklessness."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 826-829 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) ("In 14 States, capital punishment is
not authorized at all, and in 19 others capital punishment is authorized but no minimum
age is expressly stated in the death penalty statute .... When we confine our attention to
the 18 States that have expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty
statutes, we find that all of them require that the defendant have attained at least the age
of 16 at the time of the capital offense."); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989)
("Only one state... currently bans execution of mentally retarded persons who have been
found guilty of a capital offense. Maryland has enacted a similar statute which will take
effect on July 1, 1989." (internal citations omitted)); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
370 (1989) ("Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to
impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old
offenders."); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-315 ("In 1990, Kentucky and Tennessee enacted
statutes similar to those in Georgia and Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991, and
Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, when
New York reinstated its death penalty, it emulated the Federal Government by expressly
exempting the mentally retarded. Nebraska followed suit in 1998 .... [I]n 2000 and 2001
six more States South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North
Carolina-joined the procession. The Texas Legislature unanimously adopted a similar
bill..."); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564 ("...30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty,
comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but,
by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.").
1 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-317, n. 21 ("[W]ithin the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved."); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 575-577 ("Our determination that
the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
2007-20081
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made clear that state legislation is the dominant factor. 12
In the past decade, the Court has applied this states-based formula
twice: first to abolish the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders,
13
and then again to abolish the death penalty for juvenile offenders.1 4 On
both issues, thirty states banned the practice in question when the Court
intervened,1 5 and on both issues, the Court held that the thirty states'
prohibitions demonstrated that the practice in question, then continuing in
the remaining twenty states, violated the Eighth Amendment. Now, even if
a state such as Alabama wishes to execute a mentally retarded offender or a
juvenile offender, the Constitution prohibits it, largely on account of the
positions of thirty states as distant as Alaska and Hawaii. Given that
framework, thirty has emerged as something of a magic number in the
national movement for total abolition.
So where do the state legislatures stand on the ultimate question of
capital punishment? With the Taylor decision in October 2007, New York
became the nation's thirteenth abolitionist state. 16  New Jersey then
repealed its death penalty through legislation in December 2007,17
emerging as the fourteenth abolitionist state. Maryland nearly joined the
2007 trend, with abolition legislation dying in committee in the state senate
despite strong support from both the governor and the legislature's lower
chamber. 18 Out west, New Mexico's house and Montana's senate passed
abolition measures in 2007, as did legislative committees in Colorado and
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty .... [O]nly seven
countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for
juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice.").
12 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("We have pinpointed that the clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures.")
13 Atkins v, Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
14 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
'5 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564.
16 The number had been set at twelve since New York reinstated the death
penalty in 1995.
17 Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes
Sentences of8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007.
18 Maryland Daily Record Staff, Mixed results mark Maryland session's end
MARYLAND DAlILY RECORD, Apr. 13, 2007.
[Vol. I11
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss2/4
CRAFTING THE CASE
Nebraska. 19  Though those state legislatures began their death penalty
assessments by grappling with everything from execution methods to
budget concerns, all eventually came to contemplate the more fundamental
question at stake.
The flurry of activity in state legislatures across the nation, which
has continued in early 2008, suggests that even if the magic number of
thirty remains a long way off, the debate over the American death penalty is
back-and in all its complex dimensions. As such, the editors of the
Journal of Law and Social Change regard this piece, originally a bold
argument in New York's highest court, as a valuable contribution to the
continuing national exchange on capital punishment.
19 See Steve Terrell, Death penalty repeal passes state House, NEW MExICAN, Feb. 12,
2007; Alan Suderman, Mont. Senate votes to abolish death penalty, BISMARK TRIBUNE,
February 24, 2007; Alan Gathright, House panel votes to abolish death penalty, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007; Legislative Activity-Nebraska, Death Penalty
Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did-2206 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2008).
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